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ABSTRACT
This chapter applies recent research on environmental enforcement to a potential U.S. program to
control greenhouse gases, especially through emission trading. Climate policies present the novel problem
of integrating emissions reductions that are relatively easy to monitor (such as carbon dioxide emissions
from fossil fuels) with those that may be very difficult to monitor (such as some emissions of other
greenhouse gases). The paper documents the heterogeneity in monitoring costs across different parts
of current carbon markets. It argues that a broad emission trading system that includes more difficult-to-enforce
components can provide less incentive to violate the law than a narrower program; thus, the government
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sigman@econ.rutgers.eduEffective enforcement is critical to a successful climate policy.1 Fortunately, many of the cen-
tral elements of a climate policy may be easy to enforce transparently and with moderate transac-
tion costs. However, enforcement of other aspects of climate policy can be daunting. Enforcement
is sometimes a dominant consideration in the design of responses to greenhouse gases other than
carbon dioxide and to carbon dioxide from sources other than fossil fuels.
As a consequence, climate policy poses the novel challenge of integrating easy-to-enforce and
difﬁcult-to-enforce components in one policy. In this chapter, I discuss this issue and present
some data from existing carbon markets on the disparities in ease of monitoring and enforcement.
Empirically, monitoring costs differ considerably across compliance methods.
These differences in monitoring costs may be viewed as a reason to restrict allowance trading
to easily monitored activities. In the standard model of environmental enforcement, however, the
incentive to comply depends on the allowance price. Thus, this chapter argues that expanding
markets to include more difﬁcult to enforce emissions sources may not lower compliance; lower
allowance prices in broader markets decrease the incentive to violate the policy.
1 Incentives for compliance with a climate policy
In this section, I present a basic model of enforcement of incentive-based environmental policy
that has been used extensively in the prior literature (e.g., Harford, 1978; Stranlund and Dhanda,
1999; Stranlund et al. 2002). The model yields one simple insight that I rely on to analyze practical
enforcement issues in the rest of the chapter.
1A few recent papers address the economics of the enforcement of climate policies speciﬁcally (Kruger and Pizer,
2004; Johnstone, 2005; Kruger and Engenhofer, 2006).
11.1 The compliance decision
The standard environmental enforcement model considers a risk-neutral emitter who seeks to min-
imize the sum of compliance cost plus the expected punishment.2
Compliance costs depend on the form of the public policy. With a performance standard,
compliance costs are just the costs of reducing emissions, c(ei;gi), where ei is the emission level of
emitter i and gi reﬂects cost heterogeneity across the emitters. An incentive-based policy adds to
the compliance cost a term that reﬂects net outlays (purchases or sales) of allowances or tax paid
on emissions. Under a cap-and-trade program, an emitter with initial allowance allocation of Qi
thus has a compliance cost of c(ei;gi)+ p(qi Qi), where p is the equilibrium permit price and
qi the quantity of permits the emitter applies to its own emissions. A carbon tax is similar, but qi
is the level of emissions the emitter reports as its tax base, p is the tax, and Qi = 0. The important
implication is that an incentive-based policy gives the emitter choices on two margins, ei and qi.
The expected penalty depends on the chance a violation is detected, D(vi), and the ﬁne, F(vi),
each of which is in general a function of the magnitude of the violation vi. For either emissions
trading or a carbon tax, the violation is vi = ei qi, the difference between actual emissions and qi.
In addition to a ﬁne, most policies require that the violator “ﬁx” the violation. This requirement
attempts to reduce the probability that violating the law is the least cost option. Emission trading
systems often implement this requirement by having violators surrender enough allowances to
cover their emissions, perhaps withholding them from the violator’s next-year allocation. Thus,
the penalty is the ﬁne plus the value of permits surrendered: F(ei  qi)+ p(ei  qi) (ignoring
discounting if permits are surrendered next year). This penalty is multiplied by the chance the
violation is detected, D(ei qi) to form the expected penalty.
Thus, the emitter’s problem is to minimize total expected cost subject to the constraint that the
2Polluters may be risk averse, which would tend to strengthen the incentives for compliance, but not fundamentally





s. t. ei qi  0
(1)
Theﬁrst-orderconditionwithrespecttoqi isimportanttotheanalysisbelow. Ifli istheshadow
value of the constraint that the violation is non-negative for source i, this condition is
p [D0(vi)(F(vi)+ pvi)+D(vi)(F0(vi)+ p)]+li = 0: (2)
If ei  qi is strictly positive (i.e., the emission source does not fully comply), then li = 0. The
term in brackets is the marginal expected penalty. Thus, equation (2) implies that a partially-
compliant emitter sets its marginal expected penalty equal to the price. For an emitter to consider
full compliance, the price must be less than the marginal expected penalty (since li > 0).
To simplify this equation for applications below, assume that the probability of detection is
constant and equal to d (so D0(vi) = 0). In addition, assume the ﬁne is just a ﬁxed amount per unit
of violation, so F0(vi) = f. This sort of ﬁne is used in several emissions trading systems (see Table
1). Thus, the ﬁrst-order condition (2) becomes
p+li = d(f + p): (3)
1.2 The government’s choices
The government has some control over both d and f, but its control is incomplete. The probability
of detection, d, does depend in part on the level and distribution of public monitoring resources.
Nongovernmental forces may also be important to d. Whistle-blowers, often employees of non-
compliant ﬁrms, account for a high share of substantive environmental violations detected (Heyes
3and Kapur, 2009). In addition, non-proﬁt environmental organizations play a substantial role in
detecting violations of current environmental laws (Thompson, 2000).3
The government also has some control over the penalty, f. The government can assure com-
plete compliance with a sufﬁciently high expected penalty. As Becker (1968) famously argued,
high ﬁnes can substitute for costly monitoring in raising the expected penalty. However, high ﬁnes
are rarely used in practice. The reasons may include horizontal equity concerns and judgment-
proof problems (ﬁrms cannot be ﬁned more than the depth of their pockets). The government
may face political obstacles to imposing draconian ﬁnes. Finally, high ﬁnes may trigger costly
litigation, as violators have incentives to spend more to ﬁght them.
In an emission trading system, non-draconian ﬁnes can play the role of a “safety valve,” allow-
ing polluters to avoid buying permits during price spikes and thus effectively setting a marginal
cost ceiling on carbon reductions (Montero, 2002; Kruger and Pizer, 2004). However, a require-
ment that facilities forfeit missing allowances discourages the use of ﬁnes a safety valve. To use
ﬁnes as a safety valve, the government might eliminate this requirement or allow the emitter to
delay forfeiting allowances until allowance prices fall.
A Beckerian high-ﬁne regime could also produce a low expected marginal penalty that could
act as a safety valve if the government chooses a low enough d. In such a regime, polluters would
not disclose their violations and would face a small risk of high ﬁnes. Although it would lower
the government’s enforcement costs, such a regime would be less transparent than a ﬁne set as an
explicit safety valve.
1.3 Penalties and compliance in practice
Fines in emission trading programs have mostly been modest in practice. Table 1 presents a sum-
mary of ﬁnes in the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) and the U.S. Acid Rain Program, with
3Both of these forms of private enforcement are likely to result in a probability of detection that rises with the
violation and thus a higher marginal expected penalty than assumed in the simpliﬁed condition in equation (3).
4Table 1: Penalties with comparison to allowances prices
Forfeit Allowance price
Program Fine next period? Average Maximum
EU ETS, 2005-07 C40 Yes C18 C30
EU ETS, 2008-12 C100 Yes C17 C29
US SO2 allowance program (in 2008) $3,337 Yes $380 $550
Notes: EU ETS prices calculated from BlueNext are for 2006 (ﬁrst trading period) and for 2008-2009
(second trading period). The SO2 ﬁne is adjusted for inﬂation, from a base of $2000 in 1990 dollars. SO2
prices in the table are approximate.
price information for scale.
Compliance with emission trading systems seems to have been high.4 The UK reports no de-
tected violations of the EU ETS from 2006 through 2008 and 99.7% compliance in 2005 (U.K.
Department of Energy, 2009). Landgrebe (2009) suggests the following numbers of German facil-
ities with some sort of violation, relative to a total of 1,665 facilities issued allowances: 2005, 174
installations; 2006, 28 installations; 2007, 20 installations. Kruger and Egenhofer (2006) report
only 21 excess emissions penalties under the US SO2 Allowance program in its ﬁrst ten years.5
High compliance rates are something of a puzzle because of the low level of ﬁnes. To assure
complete compliance, the ﬁrst order condition (2) implies that the marginal expected penalty must
exceed the price. With the simplifying assumptions behind equation (3), full compliance requires
p < d (f + p). For the ﬁrst trading period of the EU ETS, the penalty for a violation was C40.
Therefore, if we believe compliance was in fact virtually complete, detection rates had to be greater
than d = 18
40+18 or 31%, at the average price of C18. At the peak price of C30, they had to exceed
4Two frauds recently perpetrated on the EU ETS are exceptions. One scam exploited cross-border collection of
the EU VAT; the perpetrators purchased allowances without paying the VAT and then resold them, claiming to collect
tax they actually pocketed (Europol, 2009). A “phishing” scam also targeted the EU ETS (Kanter, 2010). However,
neither fraud seems to reveal a enforcement problem speciﬁc to climate policy.
5RECLAIM is an exception to the high compliance rates with 85-95% compliance in early years. Stranlund et al.
(2002) attribute the lower compliance to penalties that are less automatic and to higher prices relative to penalties.
543%. The necessary probabilities would have declined with the higher penalties in the second
period, but would still have been high.6
The perceived chance of detection seems unlikely to be so high, particularly for small viola-
tions.7 Perhaps widespread violations do occur, but are not detected. More likely, ﬁrms expect
costs from noncompliance other than the ofﬁcial ﬁnes, so the calculations above understate the
private costs of noncompliance. Noncompliance may tarnish the ﬁrm’s image with its consumers,
host community, potential employees, and regulators. These concerns may loom especially large
in a carbon market with on-going government allocation of valuable allowances: the participants
may worry that current noncompliance will lower their future allowance allocations.
If ﬁrms perceive a large informal penalty, full compliance requires a lower risk of detection,
d, than it would have required with ofﬁcial ﬁnes only. The possibility of substantial informal
penalties has two policy implications. First, if the government faces constraints on the magnitude
of ofﬁcial ﬁnes, it might try to raise informal penalties. For example, press releases with the names
of violators might draw attention, lowering the required d and thus the government’s enforcement
costs. Second, high informal penalties make it difﬁcult for the government to use ﬁnes as a safety
valve. Even if the ofﬁcial ﬁnes are low enough to provide a safety valve at a relevant price level,
ﬁrms may still have strong incentives to comply because of these other costs of violation.
2 Heterogeneous monitoring costs
Relative to the enforcement problems that have been studied previously, carbon markets add the
complication of especially heterogeneous monitoring costs. Because such heterogeneous costs
may raise novel issues for policy design, this section presents information on the cost differential
for market participants. Information on costs for public enforcement agencies is not available but
6Stranlund et al. (2002) conduct similar calculations of required detection rates for the SO2 Allowance program.
7Perceived chances of detection may dramatically overstate the reality. Research on income tax compliance shows
households consistently overestimate their risk of an audit (Andreoni et al., 1998). However, the large ﬁrms involved
in carbon emissions are likely to be more savvy about actual monitoring systems and detection risks.
6likely shows the same sort of variation as private monitoring costs.
2.1 Direct costs of monitoring
Largefacilitiesthatemitcarbondioxideprobablydonotfacehighcostswhentryingtodemonstrate
compliance. They may calculate carbon emissions using mass-balance approaches or may use
continuous emissions monitoring (CEM).8 The EU ETS allows emissions to be calculated from
inputs and production technology for many sources (EC, 2007). In the US, a number of ﬁrms
already have installed CEM for CO2 (Kruger and Engenhofer, 2006). The possibility of good
mass-balance estimates of CO2 emissions from point sources is likely to keep the government’s
enforcement task manageable for these sources.
The EU ETS requires third-party veriﬁcation of emissions from facilities subject to its controls.
This approach partially privatizes enforcement and creates a system analogous to the veriﬁcation
system for offsets. A veriﬁcation market participant reports that “veriﬁcation costs ranged from
C5,000 – C7,500 ...for a simple site to C10,000 – C20,000 ...or more for a more complex
site” (Kruger and Pizer, 2004, p. 19) in the voluntary UK Emissions Trading Scheme, which ran
from 2002 to 2006. Third-party veriﬁcation probably raises social costs by less than this amount,
however, because veriﬁcation substitutes for public monitoring and for activities the source might
have conducted internally.
A survey by Jaraite et al. (2009) of Irish ﬁrms in the EU ETS ﬁrst trading period provides data
on overall private monitoring costs. It ﬁnds that “monitoring, reporting and veriﬁcation” (MRV)
costs averaged C0.04 per ton of CO2 or about C25,000 per year per respondent. Thus, monitoring
costs averaged only about 0.1% of the total compliance costs, if we assume average compliance
8The US SO2 Allowance program requires CEM for large sources, although facilities could probably have calcu-
lated emissions with fairly high precision. Ellerman et al. (2000) ﬁnd that CEM has been costly, contributing to private
monitoring costs equal to 7% of total compliance costs. However, they argue that this approach has the advantage of
separating true compliance activities from monitoring and helped convince skeptics of the environmental effectiveness
of tradable permit programs.
7costs are a quarter of marginal costs (the allowance price).9 Jaraite et al. also report that 40% of
MRV costs are for external consultants, which conﬁrms the market participant report from Kruger
and Pizer (2004).
Private monitoring and veriﬁcation costs for other sources, such as those proposed as the basis
for offsets, are probably much higher for several reasons. The emissions may not be from point
sources, ruling out continuous emissions monitoring and requiring more complicated information.
The burden of establishing “additionality” (reductions relative to some meaningful baseline) also
mayfallonoriginatorsofoffsets. Finally, therelevantactivitiesmaytakeplaceabroadandpossibly
in countries with more corruption, adding to the complexity of assuring compliance.
Antinori and Sathaye (2007) provide an estimate of monitoring and veriﬁcation costs for off-
sets. The 28 greenhouse-gas emissions reductions projects that they study report average monitor-
ing and veriﬁcations costs of $0.30 per metric ton of CO2, although the variance is high and a few
large projects report much lower costs.10 Compared with the average monitoring costs of C0.04
(about $0.06) per ton of CO2 for covered facilities in Jaraite et al. (2009), these estimates suggest
monitoring costs may be several times higher for offsets.
2.2 Differential enforcement risks
Higher monitoring costs probably reduce private monitoring. With less thorough monitoring, al-
lowances may be subject to greater risk that the government will ﬁnd them invalid and conclude
that the emitter is out of compliance. The variation in private monitoring costs shown above thus
may lead to variation in what I will call the “validity” of the allowance: the chance that the emitter
9Ellerman et al. (2010) report a lack of ex post estimates of the total costs of the EU ETS ﬁrst trading period and
assume the average costs are half the marginal costs (a linear cost curve).
10Alternatively, one can estimate the costs of monitoring offsets by comparing prices for emissions reductions with
more rigorous and less rigorous certiﬁcation. Conte and Kotchen (2009) analyze carbon offset prices from an online
listing in 2007, 13% of which have the more rigorous certiﬁcation that would make them eligible for use in compliance
with Kyoto obligations and the EU ETS. They estimate that certiﬁed permits cost 30% more than other projects with
similar observable characteristics. Although many demand and supply factors may underlie this price differential, the
costs of the certiﬁcation probably contribute part of it. If even 10% of Conte and Kotchen’s low-end estimate of a 30%
price difference is monitoring costs, these costs are $0.54 per ton of CO2.
8is deemed to be in compliance when using that allowance. Market prices may reﬂect any dif-
ferences in validity across different sorts of allowances and, thus, provide indirect evidence of
differential monitoring costs.
Figure 1 presents the history of the premium between two types of allowances in Europe. Facil-
ities subject to EU ETS restrictions may cover their emissions either with the European Union Al-
lowances(EUAs), whichtheEUissuestopointsourcesofCO2, orwithCertiﬁedEmissionsReduc-
tions (CERs). CERs result from greenhouse gas emission reduction projects undertaken through
the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).11
The ﬁgure compares spot market prices of EUAs and “secondary” CERs on one of the major
exchanges, BlueNext.12 “Secondary” CERs are being resold, as opposed to “primary” CERs sold
by the originating project. The average price differential between EUAs and CERs from August
2008 through February 2010 is C1.64; the maximum of C5.03 occurred early in the period when
allowance prices were highest.
WewouldexpectEUAsandCERstobeperfectsubstitutesforcomplyingEUfacilities; thusthe
existence of a price difference requires explanation.13 One possibility is that the public relations
consequences of using EUA and CERs differ, even if the two types of allowances are equally valid
from an enforcement perspective. The public may view CERs less favorably than EUAs because
CERs relax the constraint that Europe has put upon its own carbon dioxide emissions. However,
the public also might prefer CERs to EUAs as “charismatic carbon”; CERs may promise non-
climate beneﬁts, such as reducing local air pollution or protecting natural ecosystems. A second
possibility is that market participants perceive a greater risk of being found out of compliance with
CERs than with EUAs. The price differential then measures the disparity in the expected validity
11The vast majority of CERs originate in China and derive from hydroelectric and wind projects (Capoor and
Ambrosi, 2009).
12Mizrach (2009) discusses the exchanges and analyzes various spot and futures prices in international carbon
markets, including the EUA-CER spread.
13The EU ETS does place caps on the number of CERs each country may use cumulatively over the second trading
period. However, this country-level constraint does not affect an individual source’s current ability to substitute freely







































EUA price - CER price
Source: BlueNext (www.bluenext.fr)
Figure 1: Spot prices of EUAs and secondary CERs and their difference
10of the two types of allowances.
Suppose the risk that the government ﬁnds a violation is dEUA for EUAs and dCER for CERs.
The penalty is the same with either type of permit because it consists of a ﬁne and forfeit of EUAs
from next year’s allocation. Using the simpliﬁed ﬁrst order condition in equation (3), the difference
in the marginal expected penalties and thus the price premium is pEUA  pCER = (dEUA dCER)
(f + pEUA). With the ofﬁcial ﬁne of f = C100, an average EUA price of C25 over the period of
price premium data, and an average premium of C1.64, the detection probabilities would differ by
1.3 percentage points, a modest amount.
However, a major objection to this calculation is that the EU ETS places liability for compli-
ance on sellers. Thus, the buyer of CERs might not believe it faced any higher expected penalty
than if it had purchased EUAs. On the other hand, public opinion may not respect the legal allo-
cation of compliance obligations, so a violation may still have public relations costs for the buyer.
Depending on the comparison between the marginal public-relations cost and the ofﬁcial ﬁne, the
1.3 percentage point disparity may be either too high or too low.
2.3 Policy design with heterogeneous enforcement costs
The variation in monitoring costs across different sources of allowances (e.g., the EUA-CER dif-
ferential) and the resulting differences in validity produce a number of issues for policy design. A
question for US climate policy is whether evidence of very high monitoring and enforcement costs
for some sources of allowances is a reason to exclude them from the market. For example, a policy
might allow only domestic offsets or no offsets at all.
The simple enforcement model above suggests, however, that even with a ﬁxed enforcement
budget, broadening the program might not reduce the compliance rate.14 Compliance could in-
crease, even as ﬁxed enforcement resources are spread more broadly, because the allowance price
determines incentives for noncompliance. Expanding the possible sources of allowances brings
14Sigman and Chang (2010) provide a formal model of offsets with imperfect enforcement.
11additional low cost sources of greenhouse gas abatement into the market, lowering the price of
allowances. This reduction in price means that the marginal expected penalty required for full
compliance falls and thus a lower detection rate can sustain full compliance.
Consider a broadening of the market that causes the allowance price to fall from p to dp.





f+dp. For example, US EPA (2009) estimates that elimination of international offsets would
nearly double the allowance price (from $13–$17 to $25–$33 in 2015; from $17–$22 to $33–$44
in 2020) for the Waxman-Markey bill. If the ﬁne were set at ﬁve times the initial allowance price
(along the lines of the EU ETS), including the international allowances would allow the d required
for full compliance to fall to 55% of the d in the narrower market.15 Thus, a ﬁxed government
enforcement budget might go farther. The net effect on compliance depends upon the relationship
between government outlays and d in the narrower and broader markets. Nonetheless, this change
in the required detection rate does suggest one cannot rule out broader markets on enforcement
grounds without further scrutiny.16
3 Conclusions
A climate policy that controls domestic CO2 emissions from fossil fuels may not present too great
an enforcement challenge. Experiences with the EU ETS and the U.S. SO2 trading program sug-
gest a high degree of compliance with emission trading, despite non-draconian penalties. High
compliance may partly result from public relations costs for violators.
Previous experience does suggest that monitoring costs vary substantially across different types
15This example illustrates possible magnitudes only. The actual Waxman-Markey legislation sets the excess emis-
sion ﬁne at twice the allowance price (H.R. 2454, 111th Congress, Section 723). This rule would reduce compliance
incentives along with compliance costs and not give rise to the effect in the text.
16This analysis takes a narrow view of “compliance” for offsets, considering only whether actions promised are
undertaken, not whether they contribute to an overall reduction in atmospheric greenhouse gases. Elsewhere in this
volume, Bushnell (2010) and Borenstein (2010) consider broader issues in expanding the sources of greenhouse gas
abatement.
12of allowances in current markets. This variation raises some interesting questions for future anal-
ysis. For example, it would be useful to study whether enforcement agencies could improve the
overall efﬁciency of the program by narrowing the difference in the validity of allowances from
different sources.
A policy response to the variation in enforcement costs could be to restrict the market to areas
of low enforcement cost. However, the simple model presented here suggests that broader markets
may not lower compliance if they allow lower allowance prices. This analysis shows the impor-
tance of recognizing that enforcement strategies can respond to market conditions and that market
conditions may be sensitive to these strategies. Both aspects of this relationship deserve additional
study.
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